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Absztrakt.  
Egy ellátási láncot vizsgálunk egy beszállítóval és egy termelıvel. A termelı kereslete idıben 
ismert.  A  termelı  és  a  beszállító  költségfüggvénye  kvadratikus  termelési  és  készlettartási 
költségbıl áll. Ezen kívül értelmezünk egy lineáris beszerzési költséget termelı és a beszállító 
között. A modell ebben az értelmezésben egy differenciáljátékként értelmezhetı. A beszállító 
döntési  változója  az  értékesítési  (beszerzési)  ár  és  a  termelési  rátája,  míg  a  termelınek  a 
beszerzési  mennyiség  és  a  termelési  ráta.  A  problémát,  mint  egy  Nash-játékot  és  mint 
kooperatív  játékot  értelmezzük,  amit  a  Pareto-megoldásként  értelmezünk.  A  feladatot  így 
visszavezethetjük egy Holt-Modigliani-Muth-Simon (HMMS) problémára. 
 
Kulcsszavak: Optimális irányítás, Ellátási láncok koordinációja, Nagykereskedelmi árszerzıdés, Dinamikus játék 
 
 
Abstract.  
We investigate a supply chain with a supplier and a manufacturer. The manufacturer knows 
the demand for her product. The product is produced from a product supplied by the supplier. 
The purchased product is stored in a cross-docking way, i.e. there is no inventory of the 
purchased product and the planned production is ordered from the supplier. The costs of the 
manufacturer  consist  of  quadratic  inventory  holding  costs,  quadratic  production  cost,  and 
linear purchasing cost. It is assumed that the market price of the end product is known as well, 
so the sales of the producer are calculated. The linear purchasing cost is paid to the supplier. 
The goal of the manufacturer is maximize her cumulated profits. The sales of the supplier are 
the  ordering  cost  of  the  manufacturer.  The  costs  of  the  supplier  are  the  quadratic 
manufacturing and inventory holding costs. The goal of the supplier is to maximize the sales 
reduced with the relevant costs. The supplier and the manufacturer want to negotiate about the 
sales price of the supplier and the quantity ordered by the manufacturer. In this paper we will 
not examine the bargaining process which determines the adequate price and quantity. The 
situation is modeled as a differential game. The decision variables of the supplier are the sales 
price  and  the  production  quantity  of  the  supplier.  The  manufacturer  will  choose  the  cost 
minimal  production  plan  to  minimize  her  costs,  so  maximize  the  cumulated  profits.  The 
problem is a differential game with two players. The basic problem is a Holt-Modigliani-
Muth-Simon (HMMS) problem extended with linear purchasing costs. We will examine two 
cases:  the  decentralized  Nash-solution  and  a  centralized  Pareto-solution  to  optimize  the 
behaviors of the players of the game. 
 
Keywords: Optimal control, Supply chain coordination, Wholesale price contract, Dynamic game 
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1. Introduction 
 
Supply chain coordination is a tool in supply chain to avoid extra costs of the participants in 
the value chain. It is often called as vertical integration. There are a number of tools which 
lead to supply chain or channel coordination. The most important tool of the supply chain 
coordination  is  the  contracts.  (See  Tsay  et  al.  (1999)  and  Cachon  (2003).)  With  supply 
contracts the members of a supply chain can avoid or reduce the well-known bullwhip effect. 
In this paper we examine one of the supply chain contracts: the wholesale price contract in a 
dynamic environment. 
 
We investigate a supply chain with a supplier and a manufacturer. The manufacturer knows 
the demand for her product. The product is produced from a product supplied by the supplier. 
The purchased product is stored in a cross-docking way, i.e. there is no inventory of the 
purchased product and the planned production is ordered from the supplier. The costs of the 
manufacturer  consist  of  quadratic  inventory  holding  costs,  quadratic  production  cost,  and 
linear purchasing cost. It is assumed that the market price of the end product is known as well, 
so the sales of the producer are calculated. The linear purchasing cost is paid to the supplier. 
The goal of the manufacturer is maximize her cumulated profits. The sales of the supplier are 
the  ordering  cost  of  the  manufacturer.  The  costs  of  the  supplier  are  the  quadratic 
manufacturing and inventory holding costs. The goal of the supplier is to maximize the sales 
reduced with the relevant costs. The basic problem was initiated by Holt et al. (1960). A 
similar  problem  was  analyzed  by  Dobos  (2003)  in  a  HMMS-environment  for  a  reverse 
logistics problem. The bullwhip effect was examined by Dobos (2010) in a HMMS-supply 
chain. 
 
The supplier and the manufacturer want to negotiate about the sales (purchasing) price of the 
supplier  and  the  quantity  ordered  by  the  manufacturer.  The  situation  is  modeled  as  a 
differential game. The decision variables of the supplier are the sales price and the production 
quantity of the supplier. The manufacturer will choose the cost minimal production plan to 
minimize her costs, so maximize the cumulated profits. The problem is a differential game 
with  two  players.  The  problem  is  a  Holt-Modigliani-Muth-Simon  (HMMS-)  type  model 
extended with linear purchasing costs. We will examine two cases: the decentralized Nash-
solution  and  a  centralized  Pareto-solution  to  optimize the  behaviors  of  the  players  of  the 
game. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section two presents the model with assumptions and 
solves  the  decentralized  case  with  the  concept  of  the  differential  game.  The  next  chapter 
investigates the cooperative solution, i.e. the participants of the supply chain sums up all of 
the  relevant  costs  and  optimize  the  system-wide  problem.  In  this  section  we  will  not 
investigate the sharing of the benefits. In section four we demonstrate the functioning of the 
models with a numerical example. Last we summarize the results of the paper. 
 
2. The decentralized system: The Nash solution 
 
We consider a simple supply chain consisting of two firms: a supplier and a manufacturer. We 
assume that the firms are independent, that is, each makes her decision to minimize her own 
costs. The firms have two stores: a store for raw materials and  a store for end products. 
Moreover, we assume that the input stores are empty, that is, the firms can order suitable 
quantity and that they can get the ordered quantity. The production processes have a known, 
constant lead time. The material flow of the model is depicted in Figure 1.   4 
 
Figure 1. Material flow in the models 
 
 
The following parameters are used in the models: 
 
T  length of the planning horizon, 
S(t)  the rate of demand, continuous differentiable,  [ ] T t , 0 Î , 
) (t Im   inventory goal size of manufactured product,  [ ] T t , 0 Î , 
) (t Is   inventory goal size of supplied product,  [ ] T t , 0 Î , 
) (t P m   manufacturing goal level,  [ ] T t , 0 Î , 
) (t P s   supply goal level,  [ ] T t , 0 Î , 
hm  inventory holding cost coefficient in manufactured product store, 
hs  inventory holding cost coefficient in supplied product store, 
cm  production cost coefficient for manufacturing, 
cs  production cost coefficient for supply, 
p  market price of the product of the manufacturer. 
 
In the HMMS-model it is assumed that the management of the (manufacturer and supplier) 
firms have fixed a production-inventory pattern, that is, the production plans  ) (t P m  and ) (t P s , 
and planned inventory levels  ) (t Im  and  ) (t Is  are known before the planning horizon. The 
objective of the managers of the firms is to minimize the deviations from the fixed objective 
level.  The  deviations  are  defined,  as  quadratic  functional  with  known  parameters.  This 
phenomenon was empirically tested by Holt, Modigliani, Muth, and Simon (1960). 
 
The decision variables: 
 
) (t Im   the inventory level of the manufactured product, it is non-negative,  [ ] T t , 0 Î , 
) (t I s   the inventory level of the supplied product, it is non-negative,  [ ] T t , 0 Î , 
) (t P m   the rate of manufacturing, it is non-negative,  [ ] T t , 0 Î , 
) (t P s   the rate of supply, it is non-negative,  [ ] T t , 0 Î , 
w  the purchasing price of the supplied product. 
 
The  decentralized  model  describes  the  situation  where  the  supplier  and  the  manufacturer 
optimize  independently,  we  mean  the  manufacturer  determines  its  optimal  production-
inventory  strategy  first  (the  market  demand  is  given  exogenously),  then  she  orders  the 
necessary quantity of products to meet the known demand. Then the supplier accepts the order 
and minimizes her own costs.  
Im(t) 
Supplier  Manufacturer 
Production  Production 
Pm(t)  Pm(t)  Pm(t)  Ps(t)  Ps(t)  Ps(t) 
Is(t) 
S(t)   5 
 
Next, we model the manufacturer in this HMMS-environment. The manufacturer solves the 
following problem for a given purchasing price w
N: 
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The  functional  (1)  is  the  cumulated  profit  of  the  manufacturer.  It  is  easy  to  see  that  the 
revenue is a known constant, so the problem can be reformulated, as a cost minimization in 
the next way: 
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Assume that the optimal production-inventory policy of the manufacturer in dependence of 
the purchasing price w is  ( ) ) ( ), ( × ×
N
m
N
m P I  in model (1’)-(2) and the manufacturer orders ) (×
N
m P . 
Then the supplier solves the following problem: 
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Notice that problem (3)-(4) has the same planning horizon [0,T] as that of model (1’)-(2). To 
solve problem (1’)-(2) we apply the Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle (see e.g. Feichtinger 
and Hartl, (1986), Seierstad and Sydsaeter, (1987)). The Hamiltonian function of this problem 
is as follows: 
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This problem is an optimal control problem with pure state variable constraints. To obtain the 
necessary and sufficient conditions of optimality we need the Lagrangian function: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) . ), ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), ( t I t t t t P t I H t t t t P t I L m m m m m m m m m m m × + = l y l y  
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Lemma 1 ( ) ) ( ), ( × ×
N
m
N
m P I  is the optimal solution of problem (1’)-(2) if and only if there exists 
continuous function  ) (× m y  such that for all 0£ t£ T  0 ) ( ¹ t m y  and 
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We do not prove the above lemma; its proof can be found in the above mentioned literature. 
The optimal solution can be easy constructed, if the optimal production rate and the optimal 
inventory level are positive in along the planning horizon. 
 
Lemma 2 Assume that production-inventory strategy ( ) ) ( ), ( × ×
N
m
N
m P I  is an optimal solution for 
model (1’)-(2). Then the optimal solution must satisfy the following differential equation: 
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with initial and terminal condition 
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We do not prove this lemma, the proof can be found in Dobos (2003). If production strategy 
) (×
N
m P  is known, then problem (3)-(4) can be solved. 
 
The manufacturer will order from the supplier, if the cumulated profit is nonnegative in the 
planning horizon in dependence of the purchasing price, i.e. 
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If we solve the problem (1)-(2) changing the purchasing price, we achieve an upper bound for 
this price w w
N £ £ 0 . This means that the optimal cumulated profit of the manufacturer is 
even zero, if the purchasing price is equal to the upper boundw .   7 
 
After  optimal  production  strategy  ) (×
N
m P   is  given  we  can  solve  problem  (3)-(4).  The 
Hamiltonian function of problem (3)-(4) is as follows 
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This problem is also an optimal control problem with pure state variable constraints. To get 
the necessary and sufficient conditions of optimality, we need again the Lagrangian function: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ). ), ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), ( t I t t t t P t I H t t t t P t I L s s s s s s s s s s s × + = l y l y  
 
The proof of the following lemma can be found again in the mentioned literature. 
 
Lemma 3 ( )
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For the case of positive inventory level and production rate the optimal strategy is presented 
in the next lemma. 
 
Lemma  4  Let  us  assume  that  production-inventory  strategy  ( ) ) ( ), ( × ×
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equation: 
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Later we use the following notations: let 
N
m J  and 
N
s J  be the optimal values of cost functions 
(1) and (3) respectively, that is, let 
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The solutions of the two models are the well-known Nash solution of this game model. This 
connection can be written, as 
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In the next section we investigate the coordinated solution of the examined model. We assume 
that the supplier and manufacturer act as a common firm and minimize the costs together. The 
Nash solution has a property that the profit of the manufacturer is equal to zero. It means that 
all of the profits are realized at the supplier in our model. 
 
3 The centralized system: The Pareto optimal solution 
 
In this section we solve the centralized model, that is, the model, where the manufacturer and 
supplier coordinate their decisions and sum up the relevant profits. The cost functional does 
not depend on the purchasing price in this model. The purchasing price is an inner accounting 
tool of the gains. In this paper we do not investigate the distribution of the profits at the end of 
the planning horizon. The model is as follows 
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The Hamiltonian function of model (5)-(8) is 
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The Lagrangian function is 
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The following lemma formalizes the well-known optimality conditions. Its proof can be found 
in the literature mentioned in the previous section. 
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The  optimal  centralized  production  strategies  for  the  manufacturer  and  the  supplier 
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These two equations are the optimal linear decision rules. (See Holt-Modigliani-Muth-Simon 
(1960).)  Differentiating  adjoint  variables  ) (× m y   and  ) (× s y ,  and  then  substituting  into  the 
conditions,  the  necessary  and  sufficient  conditions  become  a  system  of  linear  differential 
equations: 
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with initial and ending conditions 
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Finally,  consider  a  notation:  let  ( ) (.) (.),
P
s
P
m ms
P
ms P P J J =   denote  the  optimal  value  of  cost 
function (5). It is easy to see that
N
s
N
m
P
ms J J J + £ , i.e. the Pareto solution of the problem has a 
lower cost and a higher profit. 
 
4. A numerical example   11 
 
Take the following parameters and cost functions in problems (1)-(2), (3)-(4) and (5)-(8), as 
in Table 1.  
 
Table 1. Parameter specification for the example 
 
In the following we solve the decentralized and the centralized problem. 
 
5.1 The solution of the decentralized problem 
 
The  decentralized  problem  is  a  hierarchical  production  planning  problem.  First  the 
manufacturer solves her planning problem then the optimal ordering policy is forwarded to 
the  supplier.  Finally,  the  supplier  optimizes  her  own  relevant  costs  based  on  the  known 
ordering policy of the manufacturer. 
 
First we determine the upper bound for the purchasing price. If the purchasing price is greater 
than this value, then the manufacturer has a negative profit and she looks for a new supplier 
with a lower purchasing price. The problem of the manufacturer is as follows: 
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The revenue of the manufacturer is equal to 12.56. The upper bound is 0.4, i.e.  4 . 0 = w . Let 
us now substitute this value of the cost function of the manufacturer. The optimal solution can 
be determined with help of Lemma 2, because the optimal inventory level and production rate 
are positive. Let the optimal the optimal solution be functions  ) (×
N
m P  and  ) (×
N
m I . 
 
Description  Data 
Length of planning horizon: T  5 
Demand rates: S(t)  sin(t)+2 
Delay of the supply: t  0.5 
Manufacturing rate goal level:  ) (× m P   1.0 
Supply rate goal level:  ) (× s P   0.85 
Inventory size goal level in manufacturing store:  ) (× m I   0.5 
Inventory size goal level in supply store:  ) (× s I   0.3 
Initial inventory level in manufacturing store:  ) 0 ( m I   0.25 
Initial inventory level in manufacturing store:  ) 0 ( s I   0.5 
Manufacturing cost coefficient: cm  1.0 
Supply cost coefficient: cs  0.5 
Inventory holding cost coefficient in manufacturing store: hm  2 
Inventory holding cost coefficient in supply store: hs  1 
Sales price of the end product  0.764   12 
The minimal cost of the manufacturer is 9.594 units, that is,  594 . 9 =
N
m J . The cumulate profit 
is zero. 
 
Figure 2. Optimal manufacturing and supply rates for the decentralized models 
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In the next step we solve the problem of the supplier, where the manufacturer’s ordering 
policy  ) (×
N
m P  is given: 
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The optimal solution for the supplier is functions  ) (×
N
s P  and  ) (×
N
s I , applying the results of 
Lemma 4. 
 
The optimal production rates and inventory levels are shown in Figures 2 and 3. 
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Figure  3.  Optimal  manufacturing  and  supply  inventory  levels  for  the  decentralized 
models 
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The cumulated profit of the supplier is 1.306 units, that is  306 . 1 =
N
s J . The total cost of 
manufacturer and supplier is 8.288 units in this decentralized strategy of the supply chain, that 
is  288 . 8 = +
N
s
N
m J J . 
 
5.2 The solution of the centralized problem 
 
In the following we solve the centralized problem: 
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The optimal solution of this problem is given after the solution of the following differential 
equation (see (9)): 
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with initial and terminal conditions 
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The optimal production rates and inventory levels are shown in Figures 4 and 5. 
 
Figure 4. Optimal manufacturing and supply rates for the centralized model 
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Figure 5. Optimal manufacturing and supply inventory levels for the centralized model 
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The minimal cost of the centralized system is 6.887 units, where the manufacturer’s cost is 
4.656  units  and  the  supplier’s  cost  is  2.231  units,  that  is,  887 . 6 =
c
ms J ,  656 . 4 =
c
m J   and 
231 . 2 =
c
s J . 
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5.3 Comparison of the solutions of the decentralized and the centralized system 
 
First, compare the production rate and inventory level of the manufacturer and the supplier in 
the cases of the decentralized and the centralized system, where Imdt, Imct, Isdt and Isct are 
for the inventory level for the manufacturer and for the supplier in the decentralized and the 
centralized model respectively. 
 
Figure  6  The  inventory  level  of  the  manufacturer  in  the  decentralized  and  the 
centralized system 
0 200 400 600 800 1000
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
Imdt
Imct
t  
 
Figure 7 The inventory level of the supplier in the decentralized and the centralized 
system 
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In this example the inventory level of the manufacturer decreases in the case of cooperation, 
that is, in the centralized system. The inventory level of the supplier first decreases, and then 
increases when the participants cooperate in the supply chain, see Figures 6 and 7. 
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Figure 8 The production rate of the manufacturer in the decentralized and the 
centralized system 
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As we see, the production level in the centralized system is smoother, that is, the growth of 
the  production  rate  is  smaller  than  that  in  the  case  of  the  decentralized  system,  and  the 
contrary is true for the supplier, that is, in the decentralized system the production rate of the 
supplier is smoother than that in the centralized system, where Pmdt, Pmct, Psdt and Psct are 
for the production level for the manufacturer and for the supplier in the decentralized and the 
centralized models respectively, and S(t) is for the exogenously given demand, see Figures 8 
and 5. This phenomenon is the decreased bullwhip effect in the centralized model. 
 
Figure 9 The production rate of manufacturer in the decentralized and the centralized 
system 
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The optimal costs of the decentralized and the centralized problem are presented in Table 2. 
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Table 2. The optimal profits of the example 
 
  Decentralized 
problem 
Centralized 
problem 
Manufacturer costs (Jm)  9.594  4.656 
Supplier costs (Js)  -1.306  2.231 
Total costs (Jms)  8.288  6.887 
 
 
As  we  have  seen,  the  total  cost  of  the  centralized  problem  is  lower  than  that  of  the 
decentralized one. The cost reduction is approximately 1%. In the centralized problem the 
manufacturer cost increases with more than 1% and the supplier cost decreases with 4.5%. 
 
After the above analysis the question of how to share the savings, the cooperation of the 
participants in the supply chain induces, comes on stage. 
 
5. Conclusion and further research 
 
In this paper we have solved two two-stage HMMS-type supply chain models: a decentralized 
and a centralized model. We have showed that the cooperation of the two players induces 
savings in costs. 
 
As an illustration for our results we have presented an exact number example. In this example 
the  supplier’s  cost  of  adaption  in  production  to  the  fluctuations  in  the  orderings  of  the 
manufacturer  is  higher  than  that  of  the  manufacturer.  Moreover,  the  production  costs  are 
dominant over the inventory costs. Therefore it is not surprising at all that in the centralized 
model the supplier has reduced her inventory level, and the manufacturer’s inventory level is 
higher than that in the decentralized model, and vice versa for the supplier.  
 
The  reason  of  this  fact  is  that  the  manufacturer  minimizes  her  relevant  cost  in  the 
decentralized model, so that her production level is near to the demand rate. After cooperation 
the manufacturer gives up to follow her cost optimal production strategy to allow the supplier 
to  reduce  her  own  production-inventory  cost  implying  a  decrease  in  the  total  cost  of  the 
supply  chain  as  well,  since  the  supplier’s  cost  saving  balances  out  the  increase  of  the 
manufacturer’s cost.  
 
This phenomenon points at the well known bullwhip effect of supply chains in a way: the 
supplier  decreased  the  inventory  level  after  information  sharing  (cooperation),  and  she 
adjusted her production rate closer to the demand rate. 
 
In this type supply chains the two players might have asymmetrical roles. It can happen that 
the manufacturer has much stronger bargaining position than that of the supplier or vice versa. 
To analyze the mentioned bargaining situation is left for a further research. 
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